23 Sept 2023

Celir LLP Vs. Bafna Moto (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. - However, the amended provisions of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, make it clear that the right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset stands extinguished thereunder on the very date of publication of the notice for public auction under Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 2002

SCI (21.09.2023) In Celir LLP Vs. Bafna Moto (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. [Civil Appeal Nos. 5542 - 5543 of 2023, Neutral Citation 2023INSC838] held that;;

  • The High Court was not justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when the borrowers had already availed the alternative remedy available to them under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.

  • The confirmation of sale by the Bank under Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 2002 invests the successful auction purchaser with a vested right to obtain a certificate of sale of the immovable property in form given in appendix (V) to the Rules i.e., in accordance with Rule 9(6) of the SARFAESI.

  • However, the amended provisions of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, make it clear that the right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset stands extinguished thereunder on the very date of publication of the notice for public auction under Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 2002

  • The Bank after having confirmed the sale under Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 2002 could not have withhold the sale certificate under Rule 9(6) of the Rules of 2002 and enter into a private arrangement with a borrower.


Excerpts of the Order;    

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

# 22. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, the learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant made the following submissions:

a. The writ petition filed by the borrowers before the High Court was not maintainable in view of the alternative remedy available to them under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and more particularly when such alternative remedy had already been availed by the borrowers.

b. The High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition on the ground that although the auction proceedings had attained finality and the appellant herein was declared as the successful highest bidder yet the bank was getting more amount as offered by the appellant compared to the sale bid.

c. Mere apprehension on the part of the litigant that an adverse order might be passed by a forum which was already looking into the issue cannot be a ground to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

d. The High Court failed to consider that in view of the amended provision of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, the right of redemption of mortgage stood extinguished upon publication of the auction notice. If the Borrower is permitted to redeem the mortgage at the very last moment, more particularly even after payment of entire amount by the auction purchaser, then no auction would ever attain finality and indirectly, the borrower is given indefinite time to repay the outstanding amount.

e. The High Court failed to appreciate an important fact that the Bank had already confirmed the sale of the secured asset to the appellant and as such the appellant had a vested right to the secured asset. Once the sale was confirmed, the Bank in accordance with Rule 9(2) read with Rule 9(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, (“Rules of 2002”) was under a legal obligation to issue a sale certificate to the appellant. The Bank could not have consented before the High Court to the borrowers’ plea of redemption. f. The High Court committed a serious error of law in considering the equities in favour of the borrowers unmindful of the fact that equity follows the law.

g. In the last, Mr. Rohatgi submitted that his client is ready and willing to make good the entire amount of Rs. 129 crore by depositing Rs. 23.95 crore with the Bank, in addition to the amount of Rs. 105.05 already deposited with the Bank.

h. With a view to fortify the aforesaid submissions reliance was placed on the following decisions:

  • i) United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon & Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 110;

  • ii) Varimadugu OBI Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu & Ors., (2023) 2 SCC 168;

  • iii) Valji Khimji and Company v. Official Liquidator of Hindustan NitroProduct (Gujarat) Ltd. and Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 299;

  • iv) Authorised Officer State Bank of India v. C. Natarajan and Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 510; and

  • v) Sadashiv Prasad Singh v. Harendar Singh & Ors., (2015) 5 SCC 574.


SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE BORROWERS

# 23. Mr. Shyam Divan, the learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Nikhil Nayyer, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the borrowers made the following submissions:

a. That after the impugned order was dictated in the open court on 17.8.2023 and subsequently uploaded on the website of Bombay High Court on 26.8.2023, the following developments took place:

(i) The borrowers transferred an amount of Rs. 104 Crores to the Union Bank of India vide RTGS, having UTR No. HDFCR52023082882894716. 

(ii) This was followed by the Respondent No.3, i.e., Union Bank of India issuing a No Dues Certificate dated 28.08.2023 thereby acknowledging that the borrowers do not owe any further amount to the Bank and releasing the personal guarantees as well.

(iii) Further, after the No Dues Certificate was issued by the Bank, the borrowers executed a registered Deed of Release in favour of the Tata Motors Financial Solutions Limited registered with the Joint Sub Registrar, Thane 8 having registration No. 19283/2023, whereby the second charge that the Tata Motors Finance Solutions Limited had on the second property came to be released, pursuant to payment of Rs. 15 Crore (Rs. 10 Crore on 18.08.2023 and Rs. 5 Crore on 22.08.2023 ), which came to be duly acknowledged by the Tata Motors Finance Solutions Limited.

(iv) Following this, the borrowers have also entered into a registered Agreement of Assignment of Leasehold Rights for the transfer of leasehold rights in the secured asset with M/s Greenscape L.T. Park LLP on 28.8.2023, which came to be registered before the Joint Sub Registrar, Thane 8 having registration No. 19286/2023.

b. Since there has been full compliance of the Impugned Order by the borrowers herein as well as the Bank, the appeals have essentially become infructuous.

c. The only issue which remains is the refund of the amount deposited by the appellant herein. This is an issue between the appellant and the Bank and the borrowers have no reason to come in the way of the refund of the amount to the appellant herein.

d. There is a specific direction issued by the High Court that the Respondent Bank shall immediately keep the entire amount of Rs. 105.05 crore (deposited by the Auction Purchaser/appellant herein) in a “No Lien Interest Bearing Account” and if the borrowers pay the balance amount of Rs. 104 crore to the Respondent Bank by 31.8.2023 (which it has), then the Respondent Bank shall refund the amount of Rs. 105.05 Crores deposited by the Auction Purchaser together with the accrued interest on or before 7.9.2023.

e. The High Court correctly interpreted Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. The right of redemption is nowhere mentioned in the SARFAESI Act and in such circumstances, Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for  short, ‘the Act 1882’) should be looked into. Section 60 of the Act 1882 has been interpreted to reserve the right of mortgagor to redeem the property till the stage of the same being conveyed /transferred to a third party.

f. The aforesaid interpretation is discernible from the decision of this Court in the case of Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam and Another reported in 1977 (3) SCC 247, wherein it has been held that:

  • 34. The right of redemption which is embodied in Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act is available to the mortgagor unless it has been extinguished by the act of parties. The combined effect of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act is that a contract for sale in respect of immovable property of the value of more than one hundred rupees without registration cannot extinguish the equity of redemption. In India it is only on execution of the conveyance and registration of transfer of the mortgagor's interest by registered instrument that the mortgagor's right of redemption will be extinguished. The conferment of power to sell without intervention of the Court in a Mortgage Deed by itself will not deprive the mortgagor of his right to redemption. The extinction of the right of redemption has to be subsequent to the deed conferring such power. The right of redemption is not extinguished at the expiry of the period. The equity of redemption is not extinguished by mere contract for sale.

  • 35. The mortgagor's right to redeem will survive until there has been completion of sale by the mortgagee by a registered deed. In England a sale of property takes place by agreement but it is not so in our country. The power to sell shall not be exercised unless and until notice in writing requiring payment of the principal money has been served on the mortgagor.  further Section 69(3) of the Transfer of Property Act shows that when a sale has been madein professed exercise of such a power, the title of the purchaser shall not be impeachable on the ground that no case had arisen to authorise the sale. Therefore, until the sale is complete by registration the mortgagor does not lose right of redemption.”  (Emphasis supplied)

g. The aforesaid position has also been echoed in the case of Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar and Ors., (2014) 5 SCC 610, wherein this Court held that upon a combined reading of Sections 60 and 54 respectively  of the Act 1882 with Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, it can be concluded that the extension of the right of redemption comes much later than the sale notice.

h. Although the decision in Mathew Varghese (supra) was prior to the 2016 amendment to the SARFAESI Act, yet its applicability has been held valid even after the amendment of the said Act. A Division Bench of the High Court of Telangana in the case of Concern Readymix, rep. by its Proprietor, Smt. Y. Sunitha v. Authorised Officer, Corporation Bank and Anr., reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 783 has held after juxtaposing the amended and unamended provisions of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, with respect to the right of redemption available to the Mortgagor that the amended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act only puts a restriction on the right of the mortgagee to deal with the property and does not speak in express terms about the equity of redemption available to the mortgagor. It was further held that the danger of interpreting Section 13(8) as though it relates to the right of redemption is if the payments are not made in accordance with Section 13(8), the right of redemption may get lost even before the sale is complete in all respects and that holding that the right of redemption would be extinguished at the stage of issue of notice under Rule 9(1) would tantamount to annulling the relevant provision of the Act 1882 which do not stand expressly excluded insofar as the question of redemption is concerned. The said judgment of the Telangana High Court was challenged before this Court vide SLP(C) D. No. 28967 of 2019 and the same came to be dismissed.

i. The view expressed in Concern Readymix (supra) was echoed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of M/s Pal Alloys and Metal India Private Limited & Ors. v. Allahabad Bank & Ors., reported in 2021 SCC OnLine P&H 2733, wherein the High Court, inter alia, considered the specific issue “(a) till what time and date can the right of redemption of the Mortgage can be exercised by the Mortgagors / Borrowers

in the light of the amendment to Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act”. 

j. While answering the aforesaid question, the Court considered the report of the Joint Committee on the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Bill, 2016 (the Report) as well as the law laid down by this Court in Mathew Varghese (supra) and the judgment in Concern Readymix (supra), in order to determine whether the said right of redemption was available up to the date of transfer of the asset or only up to the date of publication of the sale notice. On a consideration of Section 60 of the Act 1882 as well as the judgment in Narandas Karsondas (supra), it was observed that: “62. Thus even if the sale of secured assets is under a special statute like State Financial Corporations Act, there is no deviation from the general principle that the mortgagor’s right of redemption is not extinguished till the execution of conveyance.”

k. It was ultimately held as below:-

  • “96. … that the amended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act merely prohibits a secured creditor from proceeding further with the transfer of the secured asset by way of lease, assignment or sale; a restriction on the right of the mortgagee to deal with the property is not exactly the same as the equity of redemption available to the mortgagor, the payment of the amount mentioned in Section 13 (8) of the SARFAESI Act ties the hands of the mortgagee (secured creditor) from exercising any of the powers conferred under the Act; that redemption comes later; extinction of the right of redemption comes much later than the sale notice; and the right of redemption is not lost immediately upon the highest bid made by a purchaser in an auction being accepted. We also hold that such a right would continue till the execution of a conveyance i.e. issuance of sale certificate in favour of the mortgagee. A similar view has been taken by this Bench in Hoshiarpur Roller Flour Mill Private Limited V/s Punjab National Bank (CWP No. 14440 of 2021, decided on 10.12.2021).

  • 97. It would, therefore, certainly be available to the petitioners herein before the issuance of sale certificate in favour of respondents No. 2 and 3. Point (a) is answered accordingly in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents.”

l. The said judgment also considered and distinguished the judgment of this Court in Shakeena and Anr. v. Bank of India and Ors., (2021) 12 SCC 761, holding that the said case did not consider the concept of redemption under Section 60 of the Act 1882. The observations in para 30 of Shakeena are in the nature of obiter dicta as in the said case the auction had concluded prior to the amendment of Section 13(8) and in any event the sale certificate had already been issued. Thus, the question of interpretation of Section 13(8) was not directly in issue.

m. A perusal of the Report (the report of Joint Committee on the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debt Laws and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Bill, 2016), more particularly para 24, indicates that the proposed amendment to Section 13(8) of the Act was intended to deal with: - “Provisions to stop secured creditor to lease or assignment or sale in the prescribed conditions”. The important thing to note is also that the report does not indicate that the Committee had considered the effect of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which is a general law regarding redemption of mortgage vis-a-vis the provisions of SARFAESI.

n. The focus of the Committee in the said report is on the obligations of the Mortgagee to not create third party rights up to a certain time-period, but it is silent on the rights of the Mortgagor to exercise its redemption for which Section 60 of the Act 1882 is the relevant provision.

o. It is further necessary to note that the non obstante clause in Section 13 specifically excludes only Sections 69 and 69A respectively of the Act 1882. This section does not specifically include the words "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other Act for the time being in force" which is the standard term used in non obstante clauses. In view thereof, the legislative intent should be interpreted to only exclude Sections 69 and 69A respectively of the Act 1882 and the same does not affect the applicability of Section 60 of the Act 1882.

p. Various High Courts have consistently held that the right of redemption has to be exercised in terms of Section 60 of the Act 1882 and not under Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act and the amendment to Section 13(8) does not affect or take away this right in any manner.


# 24. The Telangana High Court in the case of Amme Srisailam v. Union Bank of India, Regional Office, Guntur, rep. by its Region Head & Deputy General Manager, Andhra Pradesh & Ors., W.P. No. 11435 of 2021 decided on 17.08.2022 has referred to and relied upon on Concern Readymix (supra) and Pal Alloys (supra). The Telangana High Court in Amme Srisailam (supra) in turn has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of S. Karthik & Ors. v. N. Subhash Chand Jain & Ors., (2022) 10 SCC 641. The Telangana High Court in Amme Srisailam (supra) held as under:

  • “44. Before we revert back to the facts of the present case, we may also refer to Sections 35 and 37 of the SARFAESI Act. While Section 35 says that the provisions of the SARFAESI Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force, Section 37 clarifies that provisions of the SARFAESI Act or the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. 

  • 45. This brings us to Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 60 says that at any time after the principal amount has become due, the mortgagor has a right, on payment or tender, of the mortgage money, to require the mortgagee (a) to deliver to the mortgagor the mortgage deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property which are in possession or power of the mortgagee, (b) where the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property, to deliver possession thereof back to the mortgagor, and (c) at the cost of the mortgagor either to retransfer the mortgaged property to him or to such third person as he may direct, or to execute and to have registered an acknowledgement in writing that any right in derogation of his interest transferred to the mortgagee has been extinguished. As per the proviso, the right conferred under the aforesaid provision shall not be extinguished by any act of the parties or by decree of a Court.

  • 46. Therefore, on a careful application of Sections 35 and 37 of the SARFAESI Act, it is evident that the situation contemplated under Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act does not exclude application of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. As explained by this Court in Concern Readymix (supra), a restriction on the right of the mortgagee to deal with the property post issuance of notice for public auction is not the same as the right of redemption available to the mortgagor. 

  • 47. In so far the present case is concerned, admittedly the bid amount of the petitioner was Rs.57.00 lakhs. Though the auction was conducted on 16.03.2021 and payment was made by the petitioner within the stipulated period, there is clear dispute between the parties as regards issuance of sale certificate by respondent Nos.1 and 2 in favour of the petitioner. However, admittedly there is no registration of any sale certificate. On the other hand, the borrower had approached respondent Nos.1 and 2 for settlement of the loan account under OTS Scheme on 18.03.2021 which was recommended by second respondent on 20.03.2021 and was accepted by first respondent on 31.03.2021 for an amount of Rs.5.10 crores, which has been paid by the borrower i.e., third respondent. On the one hand petitioner's amount was Rs.57.00 lakhs which the petitioner had paid but on the other hand third respondent has paid Rs.5.10 crores as per the OTS. Lending of money, recovery of dues and entering into OTS are all commercial decisions which are taken by the banks/financial institutions in their best interest, subject of course within the statutory framework. In this case, we have already come to the conclusion that third respondent had not lost the right of redemption upon publication of notice for auction sale. If that be the position, then it should be left to the discretion of the secured creditor as to which course of action would be  more beneficial to it. Evidently, the OTS with the third respondent is much more beneficial to the secured creditors i.e., respondent Nos.1 and 2 and as has been explained above such a course of action is not restricted or extinguished by Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act.

  • xxx xxx xxx

  • 50. Right to property is a valuable right. Though no longer a fundamental right, it is still a constitutional right. The interpretation which we have adopted subserves such a right. That apart, third respondent had not lost the right of redemption upon publication of notice for auction sale; his right of redemption would have been lost only upon the sale certificate getting registered which admittedly has not taken place. Therefore, the action of respondent Nos.1 and 2 in accepting the higher OTS amount of the third respondent though after publication of notice for public auction and auction is justified and cannot be faulted.”


# 25. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed that there being no merit in the present appeals, those may be dismissed.


ANALYSIS

# 26. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record the following questions fall for our consideration:

  • (a) Whether the High Court was justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution more particularly when the alternative remedy available to the Borrowers had already been availed of? 

  • (b) Whether the confirmation of sale by the Bank under Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 2002 invests the successful auction purchaser with a vested right?

  • (c) What is the impact of the amended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act on the Borrowers’ right of redemption in an auction conducted under the SARFAESI Act? Or in other words, what is the effect of amendment to Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act read with Section 60 of the Act 1882?

  • (d) Whether a Bank after having confirmed the sale under Rule 9(2), can withhold the sale certificate under Rule 9(6) of the Rules of 2002 and enter into a private arrangement with a borrower?

  • (e) Whether the High Court under Article 226, could have applied equitable considerations to override the outcome contemplated by the statutory auction process prescribed by the SARFAESI Act?

  • (f) Whether the right of redemption of mortgage stood extinguished upon publication of notice of auction? Or in other words till what point of time the right of redemption of mortgage can be exercised in respect of secured asset under the SARFAESI Act?

  • (g) Whether the decisions of Telangana High Court in the case of Concern Readymix (supra) and Amme Srisailam (supra) lay down the correct positionof law?


# 62. It is equally well settled that the rights created for the benefit of the borrower under the SARFAESI Act, can be waived. Waiver can be contractual or by express conduct in consideration of some compromise. However, a statutory right may also be waived by implied conduct, like, by wanting to take a chance of a favourable decision. . . . . . . .


# 63. We are of the view that the failure on the part of the borrower in tendering the entire dues including the charges, interest, costs etc. before the publication of the auction notice as required by Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, would also sufficiently constitute extinguishment of right of redemption of mortgage by the act of parties as per the proviso to Section 60 of the Act 1882. Furthermore, in the case on hand, there was no claim for right  of redemption by the borrower either before the publication of the auction notice or even thereafter. The borrowers entered into the fray only after coming to know of the confirmation of auction. Be that as it may, once the Section 13(8) stage was over and auction stood concluded, it could be said that there was an intentional relinquishment of his right of redemption under Section 13(8), whereby the Bank declared the appellant as the successful auction purchaser having offered the highest bid in accordance with the terms of the auction notice.


# 68. However, with the advent of the 2016 Amendment, Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act now uses the expression “before the date of publication notice for public auction or inviting quotations or tender from public or private treaty for transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale of the secured assets” which by no stretch of imagination could be said to be in consonance with the general rule under the Act 1882 that the right of redemption is extinguished only after conveyance by registered deed. Thus, in the light of clear inconsistency between Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act and Section 60 of the Act 1882 the former special enactment overrides the latter general enactment in light of Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act. Thus, the right of redemption of mortgage is available to the borrower under the SARFAESI Act only till the publication of auction notice and not thereafter, in light of the amended Section 13(8).


# 86. Thus, what is discernible from above is that, it is the duty of the courts to zealously protect the sanctity of any auction conducted. The courts ought to be loath in interfering with auctions, otherwise it would frustrate the very object and purpose behind auctions and deter public confidence and participation in the same.


# 98. It is an admitted fact that the entire bid amount was paid by the auction purchaser as observed at Para 10 of the Impugned Order. Thus, the Bank was legally bound to issue the sale certificate as per the language of Rule 9(6) of the Rules of 2002. The said provision employs the phrase "shall". Thus, it is an instance of mandatory provision. There is nothing more in the realm of law that the auction purchaser can do once he has made the entire payment to the Bank. The fact that the Respondent Bank failed to issue the sale certificate raises serious concerns, when there was no stay by any competent forum. Even otherwise the general conduct of the Respondent Bank has not been satisfactory. Once the entire bid price is paid and there is no stay granted by any forum known to law, the Bank is duty bound to issue a valid Sale Certificate and hand over the physical possession of the secured asset to the auction purchaser.


# 100. Bank is duty bound to follow the provisions of the law as any other litigant. It is to be noted that the Bank i.e., the secured creditor acts under the SARFAESI Act through the authorised officer who is appointed under Section 13(2). Thus, the authorised officer and the Bank cannot act in a manner so as to keep the sword hanging on the neck of the auction purchaser. The law treats everyone equally and that includes the Bank and its officers. The said enactments were enacted for speedy recovery and for benefitting the public at large and does not give any license to the Bank officers to act de hors the scheme of the law or the binding verdicts.


# 104. The proposition of law as discernible from the aforesaid decisions is that equity cannot supplant the law. Equity has to follow law, if the law is clear and unambiguous.


# 105. We summarise our final conclusion as under:

(i) The High Court was not justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when the borrowers had already availed the alternative remedy available to them under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.

(ii) The confirmation of sale by the Bank under Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 2002 invests the successful auction purchaser with a vested right to obtain a certificate of sale of the immovable property in form given in appendix (V) to the Rules i.e., in accordance with Rule 9(6) of the SARFAESI.

(iii) In accordance with the unamended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, the right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset was available till the sale or transfer of such secured asset. In other words, the borrower’s right of redemption did not stand terminated on the date of the auction sale of the secured asset itself and remained alive till the transfer was completed in favour of the auction purchaser, by registration of the sale certificate and delivery of possession of the secured asset. However, the amended provisions of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, make it clear that the right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset stands extinguished thereunder on the very date of publication of the notice for public auction under Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 2002. In effect, the right of redemption available to the borrower under the present statutory regime is drastically curtailed and would be available only till the date of publication of the notice under Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 2002 and not till the completion of the sale or transfer of the secured asset in favour of the auction purchaser.

(iv) The Bank after having confirmed the sale under Rule 9(2) of the Rules of 2002 could not have withhold the sale certificate under Rule 9(6) of the Rules of 2002 and enter into a private arrangement with a borrower.

(v) The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution could not have applied equitable considerations to overreach the outcome contemplated by the statutory auction process prescribed under the SARFAESI Act.

(vi) The two decisions of the Telangana High Court in the case of Concern Readymix (supra) and Amme Srisailam (supra) do not lay down the correct position of law. In the same way, the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Pal Alloys (supra) also does not lay down the correction position of law.

(vii) The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sri Sai Annadhatha Polymers (supra) and the decision of the Telangana High Court in the case of K.V.V. Prasad Rao Gupta (supra) lay down the correct position of law while interpreting the amended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act.


# 106. In the result, both the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed.


# 107. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside.


# 108. The respondent Bank shall refund the entire amount deposited by the borrowers i.e., an amount of Rs.129 crore paid by them in lieu of the redemption of mortgage of the secured asset at the earliest. The appellant herein shall pay an additional amount of Rs. 23.95 crore to the Bank within a period of one week from today and subject to such deposit, the Bank shall issue the sale certificate in accordance with Rule 9(6) of the Rules of 2002.


# 109. The pending applications if any shall stand disposed of.


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3 Sept 2023

Canara Bank Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors - As per the settle position of law, if the legislature confers the later enactment with a non-obstante clause, it means the legislature wanted the subsequent / later enactment to prevail. Thus, a ‘priority’ conferred / provided under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act would prevail over the recovery mechanism of the MSMED Act.

 HC of HP (21.08.2023) In Canara Bank Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. [CWP No. 5194 of 2023] held that;

  • As per the settle position of law, if the legislature confers the later enactment with a non-obstante clause, it means the legislature wanted the subsequent / later enactment to prevail. Thus, a ‘priority’ conferred / provided under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act would prevail over the recovery mechanism of the MSMED Act. 

  • The aforesaid is to be considered along with the fact that under provisions of the MSMED Act, more particularly Section 15 to 23, no ‘priority’ is provided with respect to the dues under the MSMED Act, like Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act.

  • While exercising power under Section 14  of the SARFAESI Act, even the District Magistrate has no jurisdiction and/or District Magistrate and/or even the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute between secured creditor and debtor.

  • Mere storage of moveable articles by Sh. Love Kanwar or M/s Hema Industries (earlier lease holder), cannot be the basis for depriving the secured creditor-bank to recover the secured interest on the lease-hold immovable property by putting it to E-auction under SARFAESI Act.



Excerpts of the Order;    

Petitioner being a Nationalized Bank, has filed the instant petition, with a following reliefs:-

  • (i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus for directing the Respondents No. 1 to 3 to transfer the lease hold right of the property i.e. all piece and parcel of land and building Plot No. 108, B. EPIP Jharmajri, Baddi, District Solan, H.P. in favour of the auction purchaser i.e. respondent No.4 (performa respondent) as the proforma respondent has paid full and final sale consideration to the petitioner Bank.

  • (ii) That respondent No.3 may kindly be directed to register sale certificate and enter mutation in the revenue record.


# 2. FACTS OF THE CASE

2(i) The background matrix of the case is that M/s Oceano Graphics through its proprietor, namely Sh. Praveen Behel, raised a loan with liability of Rs. 89.64 lakhs as on 31.12.2020, for his business purposes from the Petitioner-Bank, SARM Branch, Chandigarh. The loanee created security interest by mortgaging the Lease Hold Rights in land and building situated at Plot No. 108- B, EPIP Phase-I Jharmajri Baddi, District Solan, (HP), by deposit of original lease deed bearing registration No. 956/17 dated 14.6.2017, Annexure P-1, registered with Sub Registrar Baddi, District Solan (HP) in favour of Petitioner-Bank, on the basis of a transaction between the State of H.P. through the Deputy Director of Industries and M/s Oceanco Graphics, Plot No. 108-B, EPIP, Phase-I, Jharmajri Baddi, District Solan (HP) and that consequently this property stood transferred in favour of M/s Oceano Graphics (Loanee), from M/s Hema industries. Since, the loanee, as aforesaid, failed to discharge loan liability, the Petitioner-Bank, being the secured creditor declared the aforesaid loan account as NPA on 23.10.2017. Consequently, notice under Section 13(2) of The Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as SARFAESI Act) was issued on 23.11.2017, Annexure P-2, but since the Loanee and Guarantor did not clear the outstanding dues within the statutory period of 60 days, therefore, the Petitioner-Bank issued notice under Section 13(4) for taking over the possession of the aforesaid mortgaged property on 23.08.2021, Annexure P-3.


2(ii) It is further averred that one Sh. Love Kanwar, on behalf of M/s Hema Industries, who was lease holder of the property at Plot No. 108-B EPIP, Phase-I, Jharmajri, District Solan prior to the transfer of Lease Hold Rights of such plot-property in favour of M/s Oceano Graphics on 14.06.2017; the aforesaid Sh. Love Kanwar instituted a Civil Suit No. 1485 of 2018 and in CMA No.283/6 of 2018, filed therein, the learned Civil Judge, Court No.2, Nalagarh (HP) passed an order of temporary injunction on 24.1.2019, Annexure P-4, against the Bank from selling, shifting, removing and disposing off in any manner the suit property i.e. 5 machines, one compressor, one refrigerator of LG, make, one double bed, one Onida TV, three almirahs full size, one room cooler, one office table, four office chairs steel, two plastic chairs, one computer, two slider wooden racks, approximately 1500 printed boxes, two LPG Cylinders and one gas stove lying in the premises. The temporary injunction was granted which were qua the above moveable articles kept by M/s Hema Industries from a time prior to the transfer of lease rights in favour of M/s Oceano Graphics i.e. loanee herein on 14.06.2017, Annexure P-1. Mere use of premises by M/s Hema Industries for keeping his moveable articles cannot be the basis for curtailing or frustrating the rights of secured creditor-petitioner-bank under the SARFAESI Act. The rights of secured creditor-Petitioner-Bank to recover its dues from aforesaid loanee, under SARFAESI Act, could not have been interfered with by the learned Civil Court in view of the bar in Section 34 of the Act and that too when, proceedings under Section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act had already begun on 23.11.2017, Annexure P-2. More storage of moveable articles by Sh. Love Kanwar or M/s Hema Industries (earlier lease holder), cannot be the basis for depriving the secured creditor-bank to recover the secured interest on the lease-hold immovable property by putting it to E-auction under SARFAESI Act. 


2(iii) In order to recover the outstanding liability, the Petitioner-Bank first created charge on such secured asset on 16.6.2017, Annexure P-5, under Section 20 of the Act. Thereafter, E-auction/Sale notice, dated 20.04.2018, Annexure P-7 was published in accordance with the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Consequently, the mortgaged property i.e. the secured asset was auctioned by the Authorized Officer-ARMB, Circle Office, Canara Bank, Chandigarh and the Sale Certificate was issued in favour of Auction Purchaser i.e. Respondent No.4 Sh. Sunil Dutt Sharma, on 29.01.2022, Annexure P-8.


2(iv) It is the case of the Petitioner-Bank that after the issuance of Sale Certificate, the aforesaid property ought to have been registered in the name of Auction Purchaser i.e. respondent No.4 for which the Bank as well as respondent No.4 requested the Respondent No.3 i.e. Sub-Registrar-cum-Assistant Collector, Grade-I, Baddi, District Solan to do the needful but the Respondent No.3 verbally conveyed its inability, without disclosing any cogent and tangible reasons.


2(v) Feeling aggrieved, against refusal to register, the Sale Certificate, vide Annexure P-8, the Petitioner-Bank has come up, in the instant petition seeking direction to the respondents, to register the Sale Certificate in favour of Respondent No.4-Auction Purchaser.


2(vi) The matter was listed before this Court on 07.08.2023 when, this Court issued notice to the respondents with directions to file Reply/Instructions within a week and then on 14.08.2023, then on 16.08.2023. Today on 21.08.2023, the matter was again listed when, it was pointed out by Mr. Sanjay Dalmia, learned Counsel that the matter in issue is squarely covered by the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank vs. Union of India & Ors (2022)7 SCC 260 and the judgment passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court in LPA No. 156 of 2021, titled as State of H.P. & Os vs. State Bank of India and Ors alongwith connected matters, decided on 12.04.2023; and the judgment passed by Coordinate Bench in CWP No. 4751 of 2023, titled as Central Bank of India vs. State of H.P. & Ors, decided on 16.08.2023.


# 3. Faced with this situation, Sh. Anup Rattan, learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. Yash Wardhan Chauhan, learned Senior Additional Advocate General appearing for respondents No. 1 to 3, did not dispute the aforesaid position. In view of this and with the consent of the parties, we dispose of the instant writ petition at this stage.


# 4. LEGAL POSITION & ANALYSIS

4(i) In order to appreciate the claim of the petitioner and the plea of the respondent, which is not disputed on facts and is also admitted in law, the provisions of Section 26E and Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act are reproduced hereinbelow:-

  • “26E. Priority to secured Creditors-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, after the registration of security interest, the debts due to any secured creditor shall be paid in priority over all other debts and all revenues, taxes, cesses and other rates payable to the Central Government or State Government or local authority.

  • Explanation- For the purposes of this section, it is hereby clarified that on or after the commencement of the Insolvency of bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), in cases where insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings are pending in respect of secured assets of the borrower, priority to secured creditors in payment of debt shall be subject to the provisions of that code.

  • 35. The provisions of this Act to override other laws-The provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.”


4(ii) The aforesaid legal provisions came up for discussion before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank vs. Union of India & Ors (2022) 7 SCC 260, which are reproduced hereinbelow:-

  • 42.Secondly, coming to the issue of priority of secured creditor’s debt over that of the Excise Department, the High Court in the impugned judgment has held that “In view of the matter, the question of first charge or second charge over the properties would not arise.” In this context, we are of the opinion that the High Court has misinterpreted the issue to state that the question of first charge or second charge over the properties, would not arise.

  • 46. This Court, in Dena Bank vs Bhikhabhai Prabhu Dass Parikh & Anr. [(2000) 5 SCC 694], wherein the question raised was whether the recovery of sales tax dues (amounting to Crown debt) shall have precedence over the right of the bank to proceed against the property of the borrowers mortgaged in favour of the bank, observed as under:

  • “10. However, the Crowns preferential right of recovery of debts over other creditors is confined to ordinary or unsecured creditors. The common law of England or the principles of equity and good conscience (as applicable to India) do not accord the Crown a preferential right of recovery of its debts over a mortgagee or pledgee of goods or a Secured Creditor.”

  • 47. Further, in Central Bank of India Vs. Siriguppa Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. [(2007) 8 SCC 353], while adjudicating a similar matter, this Court has held as under:-

  • “18. Thus, going by the principles governing the matter, propounded by this Court there cannot be any doubt that the rights of the appellant-bank over the pawned sugar had precedence over the claims of the Cane Commissioner and that of the workmen. The High Court was, therefore, in error in passing an interim order to pay parts of the proceeds to the Cane Commissioner and to the Labour Commissioner for disbursal to the cane growers and to the employees. There is no dispute that the sugar was pledged with the appellant bank for securing a loan of the first respondent and the loan had not been repaid. The goods were forcibly taken possession of at the instance of the revenue recovery authority from the custody of the pawnee, the appellant-bank. In view of the fact that the goods were validly pawned to the appellant bank, the rights of the appellant-bank as pawnee cannot be affected by the orders of the Cane Commissioner or the demands made by him or the demands made on behalf of the workmen. Both the Cane Commissioner and the workmen in the absence of a liquidation, stand only as unsecured creditors and their rights cannot prevail over the rights of the pawnee of the goods.” 

  • 49. An SLP (No. 12462/2008) against the above judgement of the Bombay High Court stands dismissed by this Court on 17.07.2009 by relying upon the judgement in the matter of Union of India vs SICOM Ltd. & Anr. Reported in [(2009) 2 SCC 121], wherein the question involved was “Whether realization of the duty under the Central Excise Act will have priority over the secured debts in terms of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951” and this Court held as under:- 

  • “9. Generally, the rights of the crown to recover the debt would prevail over the right of a subject. Crown debt means the debts due to the State or the king; debts which a prerogative entitles the Crown to claim priority for before all other creditors. [See Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyear (3rd Edn.) p. 1147]. Such creditors, however, must be held to mean unsecured creditors. Principle of Crown debt as such pertains to the common law principle. A common law which is a law within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution is saved in terms of Article 372 thereof. Those principles of common law, thus, which were existing at the time of coming into force of the Constitution of India are saved by reason of the aforementioned provision. A debt which is secured or which by reason of the provisions of a statute becomes the first charge over the property having regard to the plain meaning of Article 372 of the Constitution of India must be held to prevail over the Crown debt which is an unsecured one.

  • 50. In view of the above, we are of the firm opinion that the arguments of the learned counsel for the Appellant, on the second issue, hold merit. Evidently, prior to insertion of Section 11E in the Central Excise Act, 1944 w.e.f. 08.04.2011, there was no provision in the Act of 1944 inter alia, providing for First Charge on the property of the Assessee or any person under the Act of 1944. Therefore, in the event like in the present case, where the land, building, plant machinery, etc. have been mortgaged/hypothecated to a secured creditor, having regard to the provisions contained in section 2(zc) to (zf) of SARFAESI Act, 2002, read with provisions contained in Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the Secured Creditor will have a First Charge on the Secured Assets. Moreover, Section 35of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 inter alia, provides that the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, shall have overriding effect on all other laws. It is further pertinent to note that even the provisions contained in Section 11E of the Central Excise Act, 1944 are subject to the provisions contained in the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

  • 51. Thus as has been authoritatively established by the aforementioned cases in general, and Union of India vs SICOM Ltd. (supra) in particular, the provisions contained in the SARFAESI Act, 2002, even after insertion of Section 11E in the Central Excise Act, 1944 w.e.f. 08.04.2011, will have an overriding effect on the provisions of the Act of 1944.

  • 54. To conclude, the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise could not have invoked the powers under Rule 173Q(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 on 26.03.2007 and 29.03.2007 for confiscation of land, buildings etc., when on such date, the said Rule 173Q(2) was not in the Statute books, having been omitted by a notification dated 12.05.2000. Secondly, the dues of the secured creditor, i.e. the Appellant bank, will have priority over the dues of the Central Excise Department, as even after insertion of Section 11E in the Central Excise Act, 1944 w.e.f. 08.04.2011, and the provisions contained in the SARFAESI Act, 2002 will have an overriding effect on the provisions of the Central Excise Act of 1944”.         (Underlining Ours).


4(iii) While dealing with the scope of MSMED Act, 2006 vis-à-vis SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the validity of the order of attaching of mortgaged secured assets, in view of recoverable dues, the Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held in (2023) 3 SCC 210, titled as Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. vs. Girnar Corrugators Private Limited and Others, that non-obstante clause in Section 26E of SARFAESI Act shall prevail over the MSMED Act, in absence of any specific express provision giving priority for payment under the MSMED Act over the dues of the secured creditors or over any taxes or cesses payable to central/state government or local authority. In this background, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-

  • 26. The short question which is posed for the consideration of this Court is whether the MSMED Act would prevail over the SARFAESI Act? The question is whether recovery proceedings / recoveries under the MSMED Act would prevail over the recoveries made / recovery proceedings under provisions of the SARFAESI Act?

  • 27. It is the case on behalf of respondent No.1 that in view of Section 24 of the MSMED Act which provides that the provisions of Sections 15 to 23 of the MSMED Act would have overriding effect and shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force and in view of the fact that the MSMED Act being a later enactment, then the SARFAESI Act, the MSMED Act would prevail over the SARFAESI Act.

  • 28. While appreciating the above submissions, it is required to be appreciated that Sections 15 to 23 of the MSMED Act only provide for special mechanism for adjudication of the dispute along with enforcing certain other contractual and business terms on the parties such as time limit for payments and interest in case of delayed payments. In the entire MSMED Act, there is no specific express provision giving ‘priority’ for payments under the MSMED Act over the dues of the secured creditors or over any taxes or cesses payable to Central Government or State Government or Local Authority as the case may be.

  • 29. In sharp contrast to this, Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act which has been inserted vide Amendment in 2016, it provides that notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force, after the registration of security interest, the debts due to any secured creditor shall be paid in ‘priority’ over all other debts and all revenue taxes and cesses and other rates payable to the Central Government or State Government or Local Authority. However, the priority to secured creditors in payment of debt as per Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act shall be subject to the provisions of the IBC. Therefore, such dues vis-a-vis dues under the MSMED Act, as per the decree or order passed by the Facilitation Council debts due to the secured creditor shall have a priority in view of Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act which is later enactment in point of time than the MSMED Act.

  • 30. At this stage, it is required to be noted Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act which is inserted in 2016 is also having a non-obstante clause. Even as per the submission on behalf of respondent No.1, two enactments have competing non-obstante provision and nothing repugnant, then the non-obstante clause of the subsequent statute would prevail over the earlier enactments. As per the settle position of law, if the legislature confers the later enactment with a non-obstante clause, it means the legislature wanted the subsequent / later enactment to prevail. Thus, a ‘priority’ conferred / provided under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act would prevail over the recovery mechanism of the MSMED Act. The aforesaid is to be considered along with the fact that under provisions of the MSMED Act, more particularly Section 15 to 23, no ‘priority’ is provided with respect to the dues under the MSMED Act, like Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act.

  • 32. At this stage, the object and purpose of the enactment of SARFAESI Act is required to be considered. SARFAESI Act has been enacted to regulate securitization and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and to provide for a central debts of security interest created on property rights, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Therefore, SARFAESI Act has been enacted providing specific mechanism / provision for the financial assets and security interest. It is a special legislation for enforcement of security interest which is created in favour of the secured creditor – financial institution. Therefore, in absence of any specific provision for priority of the dues under MSMED Act, if the submission on behalf of respondent No.1 for the dues under MSMED Act would prevail over the SARFAESI Act, then in that case, not only the object and purpose of special enactment / SARFAESI Act would be frustrated, even the later enactment by way of insertion of Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act would be frustrated. If the submission on behalf of respondent No.1 is accepted, then in that case, Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act would become nugatory and would become otiose and/or redundant. Any other contrary view would be defeating the provision of Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act and also the object and purpose of the SARFAESI Act.

  • 33. Even otherwise the Naib Tehsildar was not at all justified in not taking possession of the secured assets / properties as per order dated 24.09.2014 passed by the District Magistrate under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. The order passed by the Naib Tehsildar refusing to take possession of the secured assets / properties despite the order passed under Section 14  of the SARFAESI Act on the ground that recovery certificates issued by respondent No.1 for recovery of the orders passed by the Facilitation Council are pending, is wholly without jurisdiction. While exercising power under Section 14  of the SARFAESI Act, even the District Magistrate has no jurisdiction and/or District Magistrate and/or even the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute between secured creditor and debtor.

  • 35. Therefore, the order passed by the Naib Tehsildar refusing to take the possession pursuant to the order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act was wholly without jurisdiction and therefore also the same was liable to be set aside.”      (Underlining ours)


4(iv) A similar issue, came up for adjudication before the Coordinate Bench of this Court in LPA No. 156 of 2021, decided on 12.04.2023, titled as State of H.P. & Ors vs. State Bank of India & Anr alongwith connected matters. This LPA alongwith other connected matters were decided by relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Punjab National Bank (supra) whereby, the appeals filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh were dismissed. 


4(v) Based on the judgment in case of Punjab National Bank (supra) and Judgment in case of Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited (supra), this Court in CWP No. 4751 of 2023, titled as Central Bank of India vs. State of H.P. & Ors, decided on 16.08.2023 has held as under:-

“The action of Respondent No.3, in refusing to register the Sale Certificate dated 15.01.2021, Annexure P-3, and to carry out the Mutation thereof, in favour of RespondentNo.6-Auction Purchaser, amounts to not only frustrating the statutory provisions of Section 26E of SARFAESI Act, enacted in the year 2016 but also amounts to curtailing or defeating the rights accruing to the Auction Purchaser-Respondent No.6 herein, under the SARFASEI Act and the dictum of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, in case of Punjab National Bank and Kotak Mahindra Bank (supra) and the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in LPA No. 156 of 2021 (supra), and, therefore, the impugned order(s) passed by the State Authorities in disallowing registration of Sale Certificate and the consequential rights accruing therefrom, being dehors the provisions of SARFAESI Act and the mandate of law, referred to above, are illegal and unsustainable.


4(vi) The Petitioner-Bank-secured creditor cannot be deprived of its rights to proceed against the secured assets-immovable lease hold property as detailed in Para 2(i) of this petition, in view of the temporary injunction granted by learned Civil Judge, Court No.2, Nalagarh on 24.01.2019, Annexure P-4, in a Civil Suit when, temporary injunction was granted qua some moveable articles which were kept by M/s Hema Industries from a time prior to the transfer of lease rights in favour of M/s Oceano Graphics i.e. loanee herein on 14.06.2017, Annexure P-1. Mere use of premises by M/s Hema Industries for keeping his moveable articles cannot be the basis for curtailing or frustrating the rights of secured creditor-petitioner-bank under the SARFAESI Act. The rights of secured creditor-Petitioner-Bank to recover its dues from aforesaid loanee, under SARFAESI Act, could not have been interfered with by the learned Civil Court in view of the bar in Section 34 of the Act and that too when, proceedings under Section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act had already begun on 23.11.2017, Annexure P-2. Mere storage of moveable articles by Sh. Love Kanwar or M/s Hema Industries (earlier lease holder), cannot be the basis for depriving the secured creditor-bank to recover the secured interest on the lease-hold immovable property by putting it to E-auction under SARFAESI Act. 


# 5. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTION(S)

5(i) In view of the discussion, made hereinabove, the writ petition is allowed, with the following directions:-

  • (i) The inaction of the Respondents No. 2 and 3 in denying registration of Sale Certificate dated 29.01.2022, Annexure P-8, in favour of Auction Purchaser, Respondent No.4; in capacity of lease holder; in the revenue records is quashed and set aside.

  • (ii) Respondents No. 2 and 3 are directed to register the Sale Certificate dated 29.01.2022, Annexure P-8, in terms of directions contained in para 5(i) above; and to extend all benefits accruing therefrom etc. within six weeks from today.


The instant writ petition is allowed in above terms, with no order as to costs. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

 

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