5 Jan 2026

M/s Hindon Forge Pvt. Ltd. vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh - There is, thus, a radical change in the borrower dealing with the secured asset from this stage. At the stage of a Section 13(2) notice, Section 13(13) interdicts the borrower from transferring the secured asset (otherwise than in the ordinary course of his business) without prior written consent of the secured creditor.

 SCI (2018.11.01) in M/s Hindon Forge Pvt. Ltd. vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh [2019 (2) SCC 198,  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10873 OF 2018 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(CIVIL) NO.5895 OF 2018)] held that; 

  • That all measures having been taken under section 13(4), and before the date of sale auction, it would be open for the borrower to file a petition under section 17 of the Act.

  • That if on receipt of the notice under section 13(2), the borrower makes a representation or raises an objection, the secured creditor is to consider such representation or objection and give reasons for non- acceptance. The proviso to section 13(3-A) makes it clear that this would not confer upon the borrower any right to prefer an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17 as at this stage no action has yet been taken under section 13(4).

  • This is for the reason that, from this stage on, the secured asset is liable to be sold to realise the debt owed, and title in the asset divested from the borrower and complete title given to the purchaser, as is mentioned in Section 13(6) of the Act.

  • There is, thus, a radical change in the borrower dealing with the secured asset from this stage. At the stage of a Section 13(2) notice, Section 13(13) interdicts the borrower from transferring  the secured asset (otherwise than in the ordinary course of his business) without prior written consent of the secured creditor.

  • But once a possession notice is given under Rules 8(1) and 8(2) by the secured creditor to the borrower, the borrower cannot deal with the secured asset at all as all further steps to realise the same are to be taken by the secured creditor under the 2002 Rules.”

  • General scheme of the Act is also clear from section 17(2) which states that the Debts Recovery Tribunal, when an application is filed before it, shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in section 13(4) taken by the secured creditor are in accordance with the provisions of the Act and rules made thereunder.

Excerpts of the Order;

# 9. The judgment in Mardia Chemicals (supra) had made it clear in paragraph 80 that all measures having been taken under section 13(4), and before the date of sale auction, it would be open for the borrower to file a petition under section 17 of the Act. This paragraph appears to have been missed by the Full Bench in the impugned judgment.


# 10. A reading of section 13 would make it clear that where a default in repayment of a secured debt or any instalment thereof is made by a borrower, the secured creditor may require the borrower, by notice in writing, to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured creditor within 60 days from the date of notice. It is only when the borrower fails to do so that the secured creditor may have recourse to the provisions contained in section 13(4) of the Act. Section 13(3-A) was inserted by the 2004 Amendment Act, pursuant to Mardia Chemicals (supra), making it clear that if on receipt of the notice under section 13(2), the borrower makes a representation or raises an objection, the secured creditor is to consider such representation or objection and give reasons for non- acceptance. The proviso to section 13(3-A) makes it clear that this would not confer upon the borrower any right to prefer an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17 as at this stage no action has yet been taken under section 13(4).


# 11. When we come to Section 13(4)(a), what is clear is that the mode of taking possession of the secured assets of the borrower is specified by Rule 8. Under Section 38 of the Act, the Central Government may make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. One such rule is Rule 8. Rule 8(1) makes it clear that “the authorised officer shall take or cause to be taken possession”. The expression “cause to be taken” only means that the authorised officer need not himself take possession, but may, for example, appoint an agent to do so. What is important is that such taking of possession is effected under sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 by delivering a possession notice prepared in accordance with Appendix IV of the 2002 Rules, and by affixing such notice on the outer door or other conspicuous place of the property concerned. Under sub-rule (2), such notice shall also be published within 7 days from the date of such taking of possession in two leading newspapers, one in the vernacular language having sufficient circulation in the locality. This is for the reason that when we come to Appendix IV, the borrower in particular, and the public in general is cautioned by the said possession notice not to deal with the property as possession of the said property has been taken. This is for the reason that, from this stage on, the secured asset is liable to be sold to realise the debt owed, and title in the asset divested from the borrower and complete title given to the purchaser, as is mentioned in Section 13(6) of the Act. There is, thus, a radical change in the borrower dealing with the secured asset from this stage. At the stage of a Section 13(2) notice, Section 13(13) interdicts the borrower from transferring  the secured asset (otherwise than in the ordinary course of his business) without prior written consent of the secured creditor. But once a possession notice is given under Rules 8(1) and 8(2) by the secured creditor to the borrower, the borrower cannot deal with the secured asset at all as all further steps to realise the same are to be taken by the secured creditor under the 2002 Rules.”


# 12. Section 19, which is strongly relied upon by Shri Ranjit Kumar, also makes it clear that compensation is receivable  under section 19 only when possession of secured assets is not in accordance with the provision of this Act and rules made thereunder. The scheme of section 13(4) read with rule 8(1) therefore makes it clear that the delivery of a possession notice together with affixation on the property and publication is one mode of taking “possession” under section 13(4). This being the case, it is clear that section 13(6) kicks in as soon as this is done as the expression used in section 13(6) is “after taking possession”. Also, it is clear that rule 8(5) to 8(8) also kick in as soon as “possession” is taken under rule 8(1) and 8(2). The statutory scheme, therefore, in the present case is that once possession is taken under rule 8(1) and 8(2) read with section 13(4)(a), section 17 gets attracted, as this is one of the measures referred to in section 13(4) that has been taken by the secured creditor under Chapter III.


# 13. Rule 8(3) begins with the expression “in the event of”.

These words make it clear that possession may be taken alternatively under sub-rule (3). The further expression used in That this is the general scheme of the Act is also clear from section 17(2) which states that the Debts Recovery Tribunal, when an application is filed before it, shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in section 13(4) taken by the secured creditor are in accordance with the provisions of the Act and rules made thereunder.


sub-rule (3) is “actually taken” making it clear that physical possession is referred to by rule 8(3). Thus, whether possession is taken under either rule 8(1) and 8(2), or under rule 8(3), measures are taken by the secured creditor under section 13(4) for the purpose of attracting section 17(1).


------------------------------------------


18 Dec 2025

UCO Bank Vs. Gouri Shankar Jain and Ors. - We are not persuaded to accept the submission of the Appellant that Notice under Rule 7 (1) issued in Form – B to the Guarantor, demanding of the default amount, has to be treated as Notice for invoking guarantee. Default before issuance of Notice under Rule 7 (1), must exist on the part of the Guarantor.

   NCLT Kolkata (2025.12.15) in UCO Bank Vs. Gouri Shankar Jain and Ors.   [I.A. (IB) No. 2154/KB/2024 in C.P. (IB) No. 253/KB/2024] held that; 

  • “A claim may even be time-barred against the principal debtor, but still enforceable against the guarantor” and “The extent of liability under a guarantee as also the question as to when the liability of a guarantor will arise, would depend purely on the terms of the contract”

  • “When default is committed by the Principal Borrower, the amount becomes due not only against the Principal Borrower but also against the Corporate Guarantor, which is the scheme of the I&B Code.”

  • “We are not persuaded to accept the submission of the Appellant that Notice under Rule 7 (1) issued in Form – B to the Guarantor, demanding of the default amount, has to be treated as Notice for invoking guarantee. Default before issuance of Notice under Rule 7 (1), must exist on the part of the Guarantor. Hence, we reject the submission of the Appellant that Notice under Rule 7, sub-rule (1) is a Notice, invoking the guarantee.

  • The date of default on part of Guarantor being subsequent to 01.10.2020 when guarantee was invoked, the application was barred by Section 10A and the Adjudicating Authority committed error in admitting the Section 7 application.

  • If Deed of Guarantee specifies that the guarantee is payable on demand the Guarantor’s liability when the debt that has fallen due on account of Principal Debtor’s default, will arise only if a Demand Notice is issued and served upon the Guarantor and the Guarantor defaults in repaying the debt. Hence, there has to be a prior invocation of guarantee.

  • The decisions (supra) enumerate that neither Notice under Section 13(2) of SARFAESI, nor in Form-B under Rule 7 (ibid) constitutes Demand Notice for repayment of debt or invocation of guarantee.

Blogger’s Comments;

Generic notice under section 13(2) of Sarfaesi is for enforcement of security interest. It cannot be a substitute of recall notice on borrower or notice of invocation of the guarantee deed unless the same is properly worded in accordance with the terms of guarantee deed.


I am of the opinion that invocation of guarantee cannot be equated with enforcement of security interest. Section 13(2) notice under Sarfaesi specifically states that "in case of non payment of dues the lender will enforce the security interest". Section 13(2) notice is not the precursor to filing of the recovery suit. Non compliance of section 13(2) notice has specific consequences under section 13(4) of Sarfaesi only. How it can be deemed as an invocation of guarantee unless properly drafted in accordance with terms of guarantee deed.


Excerpts of the Order;

# 1. The Court convened in hybrid mode.

# 2. Heard the Ld. Counsel for the Personal Guarantor.

# 3. At hearing today Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Personal Guarantor submitted that the application should be dismissed as the same is barred by limitation, in support, he would furnish the list of dates which are reproduced herein below:


Date

Particulars

Page No. in CP

Page No. in the Report

29.12.2008

Common Loan Agreement entered into between CD and the consortium of Banks consisting of Punjab National Bank, Indian Overseas Bank and Financial Creditor

52

 

Working Capital Consortium agreement entered into between CD and the consortium

92

Joint deed of Hypothecation created by the Borrower i.e. the CD in favour of the consortium

148

Deed of guarantee executed by Swarnganga Gold Traders Pvt. Ltd.

18

Deed of Guarantee executed by Personal Guarantor being Gourishankar Jain i.e. the Respondent, Anil Jain, Sunil Jain and Renu Jain

45

30.09.2013

Banks declared the account of the CD as NPA

 

11.11.2013

Notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was sent to Cd and each of the Guarantors by the Financial Creditor demanding a payment of Rs.4,63,28,888.87/-

“C” 247

 

23.08.2017

Order of Hon’ble Tribunal initiating CIRP in the matter of the Corporate Debtor

 

Pg. 10

13.03.2018

Order approving the resolution plan wherein Rs.4.06 Cr has already been paid by the successful Resolution Applicant to the consortium

 

 

01.09.2013 to 16.03.2024

Bank statements of the joint bank account of the CD and the three directors and/or guarantors indicating that pursuant to approval of resolution plan of the CD, the Resolution Applicant has paid money in the account of the CD

“B” 239

 

16.03.2024

Form B Demand Notice sent by the Financial Creditor to the Personal Guarantor by speed post which was delivered on 18.03.2024

“D” 258

 


# 4. It was submitted that since the Loan Agreement was of 2008, Deed of Guarantee was of 2008, the Default was of 2013, Form – B Demand Notice sent by Financial Creditor to the Personal Guarantor on 18.03.2024 claiming the same as invocation of guarantee cannot save the limitation due to the following reasons:

  • i. There is no prior invocation of guarantee before issuance of Form – B Demand Notice;

  • ii. Notice under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act is on 2013, it does not amount to an invocation in view of the law laid recently;

  • iii. A Demand Notice in Form – B sent under Rule 7 of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process of Personal Guarantors) Regulations can also not be treated as notice invoking guarantee as held by Hon’ble NCLAT, New Delhi in State Bank of India vs. Deepak Kumar Singhania [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.191 of 2025] [Paragraphs 7, 17, 20, 25, 26 & 27];

  • iv. The DRT being moved in 2013 and the guarantee having been invoked then by calling upon the guarantors to pay the amount dues from the Personal Borrowers, the limitation would expire three years from the date of such invocation and accordingly the present petition in 2025 is barred under laws of limitation.


# 5. We have noted the following statutory/regulatory definitions, provisions and decisions carefully and understood the implications thereof.


A. Personal Guarantor:

Regulation 3(1)(e) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019, defines “Guarantor” as follows:

  • “3(1)(e). “Guarantor” means a debtor who is a personal guarantor to a Corporate Debtor and in respect of whom guarantee has been invoked by the creditor and remains unpaid in full or part.”


Thus, it is explicit that a Debtor who is a Personal Guarantor to a Corporate Debtor can be termed as a Guarantor in respect of whom guarantee has been invoked by the Creditor and remains unpaid in full of part.


B. Liability of a Personal Guarantor:

a. In Syndicate Bank vs. Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors, it was held that “A guarantor’s liability depends on terms of his contract”

  • XXX XXX XXX

  • “A claim may even be time-barred against the principal debtor, but still enforceable against the guarantor” and “The extent of liability under a guarantee as also the question as to when the liability of a guarantor will arise, would depend purely on the terms of the contract”.

  • (Emphasis added)


b. Similarly, in Archana Deepak Wani vs. Indian Bank [Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) NO.301 of 2023), it was held that “liability of the guarantor must be strictly in terms of the Deed of Guarantee.”

  • XXX XXX XXX

  • “When default is committed by the Principal Borrower, the amount becomes due not only against the Principal Borrower but also against the Corporate Guarantor, which is the scheme of the I&B Code.”


c. We have noted that the Deed of Guarantee in the present case clearly stipulates the following:

  • “If at any time, default is made by the Borrower in payment of any of the instalments of the Term Loans and the money in respect of the said Working Capital Facilities, the Guarantor hereby guarantees to pay on demand to the said Banks the whole of such sums.”


It is explicit that the default on the part of the guarantor will arise only when Demand Notice is issued as contemplated in the Deed of Guarantee. As noted earlier, the Financial Creditor has not established Service of Demand Notice upon the Personal Guarantor.


C. Invocation of Guarantee:

a. In Deepak Kumar Singhania (supra) having noted that:

  • “There is no case set up by the Appellant that at any time guarantee was invoked, except issuance of Notice in Form – B, which is claimed by the Appellant to be treated as Notice for invocation of guarantee”,


The Hon’ble NCLAT, New Delhi, held as under:

  • “We are not persuaded to accept the submission of the Appellant that Notice under Rule 7 (1) issued in Form – B to the Guarantor, demanding of the default amount, has to be treated as Notice for invoking guarantee. Default before issuance of Notice under Rule 7 (1), must exist on the part of the Guarantor. Hence, we reject the submission of the Appellant that Notice under Rule 7, sub-rule (1) is a Notice, invoking the guarantee. We, thus, do not find any error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority, rejecting Section 95 Application filed by the SBI. There is no merit in the Appeal. The Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.”

  • (Emphasis added)


Thus, Notice in Form – B under Rule 7(1) cannot be deemed to be a notice invoking the guarantee. Hence, for repayment or invocation of guarantee is sine qua non to the filing of a petition under Section 95(1) of the I&B Code, which is not established in the present case.


D. Default of the Personal Guarantor:

a. In Pooja Ramesh Singh vs. State Bank of India [Company Appeal (AT) NO.329 of 2023], it was held that “default in the guarantee arises only when after the guarantee has been invoked.”

  • Hon’ble Court noted the following:

  • “i. The Corporate Guarantee Deed dated 17.05.2019 is on demand guarantee deed and the default shall arise on the part of the Guarantor only when demand notice is issued as contemplated in the Deed of Guarantee. When the State Bank of India invoked the guarantee vide notice dated 01.10.2020, demand on the part of the Corporate Guarantee shall arise only subsequent to the notice dated 01.10.2020 i.e. non-payment of the amount within seven days i.e. default arise on 08.10.2020.

  • ii. Default on the part of the Guarantor having arisen on 08.10.2020 i.e. within the period which is covered as prohibited period under Section 10A, application under Section 7 was clearly barred by Section 10A. Issues No. II, III and IV are answered accordingly.

  • iii. The Adjudicating Authority in the impugned order has not adverted to the relevant clauses of the Deed of Guarantee as noted above. The date of default on part of Guarantor being subsequent to 01.10.2020 when guarantee was invoked, the application was barred by Section 10A and the Adjudicating Authority committed error in admitting the Section 7 application.”


E. Limitation:

a. IDBI Bank vs. Hemangi Patel [CA(AT) (Insolvency) No.991 of 2025, it was held that

  • “the limitation period for filing Section 95 application is 3 years, the same being governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act.”


# 6. To summarise:

  • i. Liability of a guarantor would be strictly in terms of the Deed of Guarantee.

  • ii. If Deed of Guarantee specifies that the guarantee is payable on demand the Guarantor’s liability when the debt that has fallen due on account of Principal Debtor’s default, will arise only if a Demand Notice is issued and served upon the Guarantor and the Guarantor defaults in repaying the debt. Hence, there has to be a prior invocation of guarantee.

  • iii. Notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act does not amount to an invocation of guarantee.

  • iv. Similarly, Notice under Form – B, sent under Rule 7 of the IBBI (Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India) is not to be treated as a notice invoking guarantee.


# 7. The Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Financial Creditor was heard and he has not argued, citing any decision to the contrary, which would tempt us to take a different view.


# 8. The decisions (supra) enumerate that neither Notice under Section 13(2) of SARFAESI, nor in Form-B under Rule 7 (ibid) constitutes Demand Notice for repayment of debt or invocation of guarantee.


# 9. Having thus noted absence of prior invocation of guarantee and due to the inordinate delay in filing of Section 95 Petition, the instant petition is dismissed. No costs. I.A. (IB) NO.2154/KB/2024 is disposed of.


# 10. Certified copy of this order, if applied for with the Registry be supplied to the parties in compliance with all requisite formalities.

------------------------------------------