11 Feb 2022

Bajaj Finance Ltd. Vs. M/s. Ali Agency and Others - In case, if the District Magistrate fails to pass the order in terms of what is provided under Section 14 of the Act, 2002 or if the same is not being implemented, the secured creditor would have the remedy of invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court (High Court) under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

High Court Orissa (10.01.2022) in Bajaj Finance Ltd. Vs. M/s. Ali Agency and Others  [W.P. (C) No. 11425 of 2021] held that;

  • The remedy, therefore, under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, would not be available to the secured creditor or his authorized officer for rejection of an application preferred by the said secured creditor or his authorized person under the SARFAESI Act.

  • Accordingly, it is held that the petitioner (secured creditor) does not have any alternative and statutory remedy before the Tribunal to lay challenge to the impugned order of the Magistrate rejecting its application under Section 14 of the Act, 2002. . . . Consequently, the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is held to be maintainable.

  • These expressions (CMM and CJM) are interchangeable and synonymous to each other. Moreover, Section 14 of the 2002 Act does not explicitly exclude the CJM from dealing with the request of the secured creditor made thereunder. The power to be exercised under Section 14 of the 2002 Act by the concerned authority is, by its very nature, non judicial or State’s coercive power.

  • The satisfaction of the Magistrate contemplated under the second proviso to Section 14(1) necessarily requires the Magistrate to examine the factual correctness of the assertions made in such an affidavit but not the legal niceties of the transaction. It is only after recording of his satisfaction the Magistrate can pass appropriate orders regarding taking of possession of the secured asset.

  • In case, if the District Magistrate fails to pass the order in terms of what is provided under Section 14 of the Act, 2002 or if the same is not being implemented, the secured creditor would have the remedy of invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court (High Court) under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

 

Excerpts of the order;

# 1. The secured creditor is before this Court challenging the order dated 9th of March, 2021 (Annexure-P/1) passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack, rejecting the application filed by the Petitioner-Finance Company under Section 14 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short referred to as “the SARFAESI Act”).

 

# 2. The brief facts are that M/s. Ali Agency, a partnership farm (O.P. No.1) had been sanctioned and disbursed a loan amount of Rs.2,81,25,000/- (Rupees two crore eighty-one lakhs and twenty-five thousand only) by the Petitioner. The Opposite Party Nos.2 and 3 are the partners of the Opposite Party No.1, and also co-borrowers. The loan was secured by mortgaging a residential property owned by Opposite Party No.3. Due to lack of financial discipline, the loan account was declared as Non-Performing Asset (NPA) on 4th October, 2017. A demand Notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 was issued on 6th November, 2017 seeking to recall outstanding amount of Rs.2,85,04,685/- (Rupees two crore eighty-five lakh four thousand six hundred eighty-five only) due as on 6th of November, 2017. Symbolic possession of the mortgaged property was assumed vide Possession Notice dated 21st February, 2018 issued under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act.

 

# 3. The Petitioner-secured creditor filed an application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act before the District Magistrate (DM), Cuttack in April, 2018 seeking providing of official assistance for taking over actual physical possession of the secured asset-mortgaged residential property. Since the same was not decided within the stipulated time, the Petitioner approached this Court by filing a Writ Petition which was disposed of vide order dated 11th December, 2018 directing the District Magistrate (DM), Cuttack to dispose of the application within a period of six months.

 

# 4. The District Magistrate (DM), Cuttack vide order dated 19th of June, 2019 decided the application on merits of the case, while rejecting the application filed by the Petitioner-Finance Company. The Petitioner was constrained to file W.P.(C) No.16549 of 2019 assailing the aforesaid order dated 19th of June, 2019 which was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 19th of September, 2019 directing the District Magistrate, Cuttack to decide the application, within the scope of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, and after giving opportunity to the parties concerned, within the statutory period.

 

# 5. As the directions were not complied with by the District Magistrate, Cuttack, the Petitioner was constrained to file a CONTC before this Court on 4th of September, 2020 which is stated to be pending. The Petitioner, thereafter, filed a fresh application on 7th September, 2020 under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack who has vide the impugned order dated 9th September, 2020 rejected the application on the ground that similar application was pending before the District Magistrate, Cuttack. Consequently, the Petitioner withdrew its application pending before the District Magistrate, Cuttack with liberty to file a fresh one, if so required. The District Magistrate, Cuttack vide order dated 23rd December, 2020 permitted the withdrawal but without liberty as prayed for.

 

# 6. The Petitioner, thereafter, filed a fresh application along with the withdrawal order on 25th January, 2021 under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack.

 

# 7. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack vide its impugned order dated 9th of March, 2021 has once again rejected the application. Hence, the present petition.

 

# 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the process of consideration of an application submitted by the secured creditor under Section 14 before the Magistrate does not involve any adjudicatory mechanism and is purely administrative in nature. Section 14 (1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 was subjected to an amendment on 15.01.2013 consequent upon which now the secured creditor was required to support its application with 9 point affidavit. The provision requires the Magistrate only to examine whether the application is supported with a 9 point affidavit or not and in case, if the said affidavit contains all the stipulations as required for by virtue of amended Section 14, it is obligated to pass an order providing for assistance to secured creditor to obtain physical possession of the secured asset. He thus submits that the impugned order dated 09.03.2021 (Annexure P-1) may be set aside as Opposite Party No.1 has exceeded its jurisdiction by rejecting the application of the petitioner/secured creditor in spite of being complete in all respects.

 

# 9. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Opposite Party Nos.2 and 3 submits that the present petition is not maintainable, as the petitioner has not availed the alternative statutory remedy by filing an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 before the DRT to lay challenge to the impugned order dated 09.03.2021 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate (Opposite Party No.1). He further submits that the petitioner has not brought on record the reply dated 04.04.2018 submitted by the Opposite Party Nos.2 and 3 pursuant to which Rs.7,57,108/- was deposited with the petitioner creditor which disentitles it to maintain the present petition. Still further, the petitioner cannot be permitted to maintain two parallel remedies for the same cause i.e. one before the District Magistrate and the other one before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Opposite Party No.1). That apart, there is no notification issued by the Government of India authorizing Chief Judicial Magistrate to exercise jurisdiction under Section 14 of the Securitisation Act, 2002. He thus submits that the present petition is devoid any merit and prays for dismissal of the same.

 

# 10. Having heard both the sides and after carefully scrutinizing the record of the present case, we find that the following issues would arise for consideration of this Court :-

  • i. Whether the present writ petition is maintainable in view of the remedy provided under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002?

  • ii. Whether Chief Judicial Magistrate would have the jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002?

  • iii. Scope of exercise of jurisdiction by the authorities concerned, while examining an application under Section 14 of the Securitisation Act, 2002.

  • iv. Relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to in the instant petition.

 

ISSUE NO.1

# 11. The first issue which arises for consideration is regarding the maintainability of the present petition. According to the learned Senior Counsel for Opposite Party Nos.2 to 3 the impugned order dated 09.03.2021 is appealable before the DRT under Section 17(1) of the Securitisation Act, 2002. He contends that an order passed by the Magistrate under Section 14 is to be treated as an action under Section 13(4) and hence is appealable before DRT by filing an application under Section 17 and consequently without first availing such alternative statutory remedy under the Act, 2002 the present petition could not be maintained by the petitioner.

 

# 12. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the remedy under Section 17 before DRT is only available to a person who is aggrieved of an action taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4). Since in the present case there is no action by the secured creditor rather the secured creditor itself is aggrieved of the order of the Magistrate therefore application under Section 17 would not be maintainable before the DRT. He further states that the writ petition is the only remedy as even the jurisdiction of civil court is barred under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

 

# 13. Having heard both sides, we find the preliminary objection raised by the Opposite Party Nos.2 and 3 is liable to be rejected. Section 13(1) and Section 17 of the Act, 2002 reads as under :-

  • 13. Enforcement of security interest. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 69 or section 69-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of the Court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

  • xxx xxx xxx

  • 17. Application against measures to recover secured debts. – (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, [may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed,] to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measures had been taken:

  • xxx xxx xxxx

  • (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub- section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession, of the secured assets to the borrower or other aggrieved person, it may, by order,-

  • xxx xxx xxxx

  • (4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of section 13 to recover his secured debt.

  • xxxxx xxxxx                           [Emphasis supplied]

 

A perusal of Section 13(1) of the Act, 2002 reflects the intention of the legislature to enable the creditor to enforce the charged securities without the intervention of the Court or tribunal. Further, the remedy under Section 17 of the Act, 2002 is only available to a person aggrieved of an action initiated by the secured creditor. Noticeably, remedy to the secured creditor to approach the Tribunal to lay challenge to an order passed by the Magistrate is conspicuous by its absence. The scheme of the Act, does not provide for a remedy to the secured creditor within the ambit and scope of Section 17 in absence of an impugned act of a secured creditor. In order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and maintain an application before it, it is necessary that there ought to be an action of a secured creditor which is a subject matter of challenge before the DRT. The scope of relief which the Tribunal is intended to grant is provided for under Section 17(4) which also does not in any way provide for an order which the secured creditor is looking for in the present petition. The secured creditor therefore would not have a remedy to challenge an order of the Magistrate before the Tribunal in such circumstances.

 

# 14. Still further Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court Allahabad Bank V/s District Magistrate, Ludhiana authored by one of us (J. Jaswant Singh) while considering a similar issue has held in extracted Para 30 as under :-

  • “30. …….. It thus clear, that the District Magistrate does not assume any adjudicatory function while examining the application of the secured creditor under Section 14 of the Act, 2002. For the same reason, we find that it would amount to no illegality if an order is passed without effective service upon the borrowers being in the nature of execution process pursuant to statutory notices served under Section 13(2) and (4) as envisaged under the scheme of the Act, 2002. Though, it would be desirable that before proceeding to take actual physical possession by the officer so deputed by the District Magistrate, a reasonable notice of say 15 days be served on the occupant so that they are not taken by surprise. It is also to be noticed that in case, a person who is aggrieved of such order, is not remediless as an order under Section 14, has been held to be an action under Section 13(4) of the Act, 2002 and any person aggrieved of the same, shall have a cause of action to challenge the same by filing an application under Section 17 of the Act, 2002. [refer to Para 20 of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaniyalal Lalchand Sachdev v. State of Maharashtra 2011 (2) SCC 782]Similarly, we find that in case if the secured creditor is aggrieved of any action of the District Magistrate or the manner and mode of its enforcement, not involving adjudication of rights of any other secured creditor, the remedy under writ jurisdiction would be available to such a secured creditor. This is because, Section 17 of the Act, 2002 can be invoked only in case, if the applicant is aggrieved of the action of the secured creditor, while in the instant case, the grievance of the secured creditor is against the non-implementation of its rights under Section 14 of the Act, 2002.”     [Emphasis supplied]

 

# 15. Similarly, in yet another judgment a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Kotak Mahindra Bank V/s Raj Paul Oswal held in Para 13 as under :-

  • “…….A perusal of the above would show that any person which includes a borrower, who is aggrieved by any of the measures taken by the secured creditor or his authorized officer referred to in sub-section 4 of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act under the Chapter, can make an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The language itself makes in amply clear that the remedy is available to a person aggrieved by any of the measures referred in sub-section 4 of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, which are taken by the secured creditor or his authorized officer. The remedy, therefore, under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, would not be available to the secured creditor or his authorized officer for rejection of an application preferred by the said secured creditor or his authorized person under the SARFAESI Act.

  • In the light of the above, the order which has been passed by the District Magistrate under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act is final qua the petitioner and under these circumstances, the remedy available to the petitioner is only under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, which remedy the petitioner has rightly availed of. Reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaniyalal Lalchand Sachdev and others’ case (supra) by the counsel for respondent No.2 is totally misplaced, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act when the person aggrieved was neither the secured creditor nor the authorized officer but any other person. The said judgment, therefore, would not be attracted to the present case.”           [Emphasis supplied]

 

# 16. We respectfully agree with the aforesaid views and while reiterating the same, reject the aforesaid submission of the Opposite Party Nos.2 and 3 regarding the maintainability of the present petition. Accordingly, it is held that the petitioner does not have any alternative and statutory remedy before the Tribunal to lay challenge to the impugned order of the Magistrate rejecting its application under Section 14 of the Act, 2002. It is well settled that any aggrieved person cannot be left remediless as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Vasudeva V/s Sundar Gupta (Para 31), which has been relied upon by a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Anu Bhalla V/s District Magistrate, Pathankot (Para 35). Consequently, the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is held to be maintainable.

 

ISSUE NO. 2

# 17. Coming to the heart of the controversy, the next issue is whether Chief Judicial Magistrate would have the jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

 

# 18. Learned Counsel for the petitioner – Secured Creditor while placing reliance upon Section 14 of the Securitisation Act, 2002 contends that the jurisdiction to entertain an application is equally vested with the Chief Judicial Magistrate as well as is with the District Magistrate. The legislature has not created any such distinction between the two authorities and hence both the authorities are equally competent to entertain application of the secured creditor and to pass orders for providing assistance to the secured creditor in taking over of physical possession by the secured creditor.

 

Per contra, learned Counsel for the Opposite Party Nos.2 and 3-Borrower contends that once the District Magistrate is available which is entrusted with administrative jurisdiction the secured creditor cannot maintain an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Moreover, the legislature never contemplated to provide for an overlapping jurisdiction with two authorities and therefore an application would not be maintainable before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, in the presence of availability of District Magistrate. He further contends that the reason why Chief Metropolitan Magistrate finds mention in the provision is that it is only in those districts, where there is no District Magistrate, could the jurisdiction be treated to be vested with the Chief Judicial Magistrate and not otherwise. He therefore supports the impugned order and prays for dismissal of the present petition.

 

# 19. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties, we find that this issue would not detain us any longer, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Authorised Officer, Indian Bank V/s D. Visalakshi and another wherein in Para 34 and 48, it has been held as under-

  • “34. Notably, the powers and functions of the CMM and the CJM are equivalent and similar, in relation to matters specified in the Cr.P.C. These expressions (CMM and CJM) are interchangeable and synonymous to each other. Moreover, Section 14 of the 2002 Act does not explicitly exclude the CJM from dealing with the request of the secured creditor made thereunder. The power to be exercised under Section 14 of the 2002 Act by the concerned authority is, by its very nature, non judicial or State’s coercive power. Furthermore, the borrower or the persons claiming through borrower or for that matter likely to be affected by the proposed action being in possession of the subject property, have statutory remedy under Section 17 of the 2002 Act and/or judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In that sense, no prejudice is likely to be caused to the borrower/lessee; nor is it possible to suggest that they are rendered remediless in law. At the same time, the secured creditor who invokes the process under Section 14 of the 2002 Act does not get any advantage muchless added advantage. Taking totality of all these aspects, there is nothing wrong in giving expansive meaning to the expression “CMM”, as inclusive of CJM concerning nonmetropolitan area, who is otherwise competent to discharge administrative as well as judicial functions as delineated in the Cr.P.C. on the same terms as CMM. That interpretation would make the provision more meaningful. Such interpretation does not militate against the legislative intent nor it would be a case of allowing an unworthy person or authority to undertake inquiry which is limited to matters specified in Section 14 of the 2002 Act.

  • xxx    xxx    xxx

  • 48. To sum up, we hold that the CJM is equally competent to deal with the application moved by the secured creditor under Section 14 of the 2002 Act. We accordingly, uphold and approve the view taken by the High Courts of Kerala, Karnataka, Allahabad and Andhra Pradesh and reverse the decisions of the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Madhya Pradesh and Uttarakhand in that regard. Resultantly, it is unnecessary to dilate on the argument of prospective overruling pressed into service by the secured creditors (Banks).”  [Emphasis supplied]

 

# 20. As regards the contention of the learned Senior Counsel representing Opposite Party Nos.2 to 3 that the petitioner would not be entitled to avail two parallel remedies, this Court is of the opinion that the said issue would not arise in the present petition, as the petitioner has already withdrawn its application before the District Magistrate concerned on 23.12.2020 and it is only thereafter that it preferred a fresh application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 25.01.2021 which led to the passing of the impugned order dated 09.03.2021 (Annexure P-1). In view of the aforesaid fact, the aforesaid argument of the Opposite Party Nos.2 and 3 would not sustain for consideration. Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Authorised Officer, Indian Bank (supra) has held that jurisdiction under Section 14 can be exercised by either of the two authorities namely Chief Judicial Magistrate and District Magistrate. Therefore, both the authorities are equally competent to exercise the jurisdiction.

 

# 21. As regards the next contention advanced on behalf of Opposite Party Nos.2 to 3 that there is no notification issued by the Government of India authorizing Chief Judicial Magistrate to exercise powers under Section 14 is concerned, the same is also equally without merit. A perusal of Section 14 nowhere reflects that the authorities mentioned therein are required to act only after issuance of a notification to that effect. Besides, learned Senior Counsel for the Opposite Parties have not been able to show any provision, whereby a notification was contemplated to be issued for any authority to exercise jurisdiction and/or Chief Judicial Magistrate could only act thereafter. Once the notified provision (Section 14) itself enables the authority to exercise jurisdiction, it is sufficient for the said authority to exercise powers as provided for within the ambit of the provision. Consequently, the aforesaid argument of the Opposite Party Nos.2 and 3 cannot sustain and hence is rejected.

 

# 22. In view of above, we answer the first issue in affirmative and therefore hold that the Chief Judicial Magistrate would be equally competent to entertain an application filed by the secured creditor under Section 14 of the Act, 2002 and would be entitled to pass such orders as would be required to provide assistance to the secured creditor to take over physical possession of the secured assets.

 

ISSUE NO.3

# 23. The next issue which arises for consideration is the scope of exercise of jurisdiction by either the Chief Judicial Magistrate or District Magistrate, as the case may be, while proceeding to entertain an application filed by the secured creditor under Section 14 of the Securitisation Act, 2002.

 

# 24. The necessity to decide this issue has arisen on account of number of such petitions coming up for consideration before this Court which is a regular feature. In an endeavor to reduce multiplicity of litigation and to clear out the grey areas, it is necessary for this Court to examine this issue in detail.

 

# 25. As is apparent, the very purpose of Section 14 is to ensure assistance to the secured creditor to peacefully take over physical possession of the secured asset if it is faced by resistance from the borrower/occupant. Further, a reading of Section 14 reveals that the authority concerned does not possess any adjudicatory mechanism while entertaining such application under Section 14 of the Act, 2002. This legal position has been reiterated by a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana8 and a Division Bench of Madras High Court in M/s Shriram Housing Finance Ltd. v. District Collector9.

 

# 26. Further, the enactment does not leave the aggrieved person remediless. In case if any person is aggrieved of any action taken by the creditor including of an order passed by the District Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate the remedy lies with DRT in view of Section 17 (1) of the Act, 2002 [See Para 20 of Kaniyalal Lalchand Sachdev v. State of Maharashtra10]. Section 34 of the Act, 2002, excludes the jurisdiction of any court or other authority from granting any injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the secured creditor under the provisions of the Act. Thus, the DRT shall be competent to examine the validity of not only the steps taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) but also all subsequent and consequential actions taken by the secured creditor under the Act.

 

# 27. It is to be noticed that Section 14 of the Act, 2002 was amended with effect from 15.01.2013 and a proviso was added, which requires the secured creditor to file an application accompanied with an affidavit duly affirmed by the authorised officer of the secured creditor with respect to 9 points stipulated therein. Such recording of satisfaction is only to be restricted with regard to the factual correctness of the affidavit filed by the secured creditor and cannot be stretched to include any quasi-judicial or an adjudicatory function. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Standard Chartered Bank v. Noble Kumar11 held as under :-

  • “26. An analysis of the 9 sub-clauses of the proviso which deal with the information that is required to be furnished in the affidavit filed by the secured creditor indicates in substance that (i) there was a loan transaction under which a borrower is liable to repay the loan amount with interest, (ii) there is a security interest created in a secured asset belonging to the borrower, (iii) that the borrower committed default in the repayment, (iv) that a notice contemplated under Section 13(2) was in fact issued, (v) in spite of such a notice, the borrower did not make the repayment, (vi) the objections of the borrower had in fact been considered and rejected, (vii) the reasons for such rejection had been communicated to the borrower etc.

  • 27. The satisfaction of the Magistrate contemplated under the second proviso to Section 14(1) necessarily requires the Magistrate to examine the factual correctness of the assertions made in such an affidavit but not the legal niceties of the transaction. It is only after recording of his satisfaction the Magistrate can pass appropriate orders regarding taking of possession of the secured asset. ”     [Emphasis supplied]

 

# 28. Further in the case of Allahabad Bank (supra), particularly in Para 8 and Para 31 to 33 it was held as under:-

  • “8. Having heard both the parties and on noticing that several writ petitions of such like disputes are regularly being filed by the secured creditors, seeking enforcement of their rights under Section 14 of the Act, 2002 inter alia involving issues as regards impact of the orders passed by the Civil Courts, we deem it appropriate to cull out the following issues, which are required to be decided in the present application :-

  • (1) Whether Civil Court would have jurisdiction to negate any right of the secured creditor under the Securitisation Act, 2002, qua the secured asset in a civil suit or proceedings instituted by the borrower/guarantor/any third party qua the secured asset?

  • (2) Whether the petitioner bank/secured creditor would be bound by an order passed by a Civil Court in a lis inter-se between parties pertaining to the secured asset, not having impleaded the Bank/Secured Creditor ?

  • (3) Scope of powers of the District Magistrate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 14 of the Securitization Act, 2002 ?”

  • xxxx xxxx xxxx

  • 33.  In view of the aforesaid discussion, in our opinion, following principles would emerge as regards the scope of functions of the District Magistrate while exercising powers under Section 14 of the Securitisation Act, 2002:-

  • (i) District Magistrate would not involve in any process of adjudication of any inter se rights of the parties, while examining any application under Section 14 of the Act, 2002.

  • (ii) Proviso to Section 14 makes it mandatory to record satisfaction by the District Magistrate which is to be restricted with regard to the factual correctness of the 9-point affidavit to be filed by the secured creditor. It cannot examine the legal validity of the steps so taken by the secured creditor as depicted in the affidavit. If the borrower is aggrieved of such steps the remedy would be to approach the DRT.

  • (iii) If any person is aggrieved of the order of the District Magistrate, the aggrieved person can approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal, under Section 17 of the Act, 2002 as an order passed under Section 14 is in pursuance to the steps provided under Section 13(4).

  • (iv) In case, if the District Magistrate fails to pass the order in terms of what is provided under Section 14 of the Act, 2002 or if the same is not being implemented, the secured creditor would have the remedy of invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

  • (v) After the order is passed by the District Magistrate, the officer so deputed to execute the said order under Section 14(1A) of the Act, 2002 would also complete the process of its execution within 60 days from the date of receipt of such order. Further in case if for any reason, the order is unable to be executed, the officer shall report the matter back to the District Magistrate, who would then pass such suitable orders as the situation may warrant.

  • (vi) Though, there is no provision for an advance notice to be given to the occupant/owner of the property before taking physical possession, but it would be desirable, that an advance notice of at least 15 days be served on the occupant before taking physical possession by the officer so deputed by the District Magistrate, so that persons to be dispossessed are not caught unawares.”

 

# 29. Since the aforesaid judgment deals with the identical issue as seized by us in the present petition in great detail, we deem it appropriate to reiterate all of the aforesaid conclusions and directions in the present order as well and hereby direct all the District Magistrates and Chief Judicial Magistrates in the State of Odhisa to act strictly within the scope and ambit of the aforesaid directions as contained in para 33 of the judgment in the case of Allahabad Bank case (supra), while exercising jurisdiction under Section 14 of the Act, 2002.

 

ISSUE NO. 4

# 30. Having considered the legal issues involved in the present petition and as delineated hereinabove, we now proceed to consider the relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to. Vide impugned order dated 09.03.2021 (Annexure P-1), the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack has dismissed the application of the petitioner/secured creditor under Section 14 of the Act, 2002. We find that such an observation is not sustainable and is not in tune with the discussion and consequent directions as noticed above.

 

# 31. As a sequel to the aforesaid conclusions, we allow the present petition and set aside the impugned order dated 09.03.2021 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack. Since, we have held that both the authorities i.e. District Magistrate as also Chief Judicial Magistrate would have the jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 therefore, the petitioner would be at liberty to approach either of the authorities by filing a fresh application in terms of Section 14 which shall then be decided by the authority concerned, in accordance with law.

 

# 32. As already noticed hereinabove, there have been number of similar petitions, where secured creditors are aggrieved of either the authorities not passing the order or the officer concerned, not implementing the orders in a time bound manner. We therefore, direct the Registry of this Court to circulate this order to all the District Magistrates and Chief Judicial Magistrates of the State of Odisha for information and compliance.

 

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State Bank of India Vs. ITMA Hotels India Pvt. Ltd. - that pendency of actions under the SARFAESI Act or actions under RDB Act does not create obstruction for filing an application under IBC.

NCLT Kochi (31.12.2021) in State Bank of India Vs. ITMA Hotels India Pvt. Ltd.  [CP(IB)/30/ KOB/ 2021] held that;

  • that pendency of actions under the SARFAESI Act or actions under RDB Act does not create obstruction for filing an application under IBC on the ground that provisions under IBC shall have overriding effect over any provisions inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.

 

Excerpts of the order;

This CP(IB)/30/KOB/2021 has been filed on 06.09.2021 by the State Bank of India, Stressed Assets Management Branch (SAMB), 1112, Raja Plaza, Avinashi Road, Coimbatore- 641 037. (‘Financial Creditor) by invoking the provisions of Section 7(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (hereinafter called as Code) against M/s ITMA Hotels India Private Limited,  ITMA Hotels, Ponnurunni North, Vytilla P.O., Kochi, Kerala 682 019. (‘Corporate Debtor’) stating that there is a total amount of Rs. 102,77,00,000/- (Rupees One Hundred and Two Crore and Seventy-Seven Lakhs Only) due from the Corporate Debtor to Financial Creditor and that the date of default is 25.09.2019.

 

The brief facts of the case are as under:

# 2. The State Bank of Travancore (SBT) and State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur (SBBJ) granted term loan facilities of total Rs. 38 Core to the Corporate Debtor for construction of hotel vide sanction letters dated 20.09.2010 and 01.11.2010 respectively. A further Rs. 36 Crore was sanctioned on 09.02.2012 by SBT and 09.08.2012 by SBBJ. The sanction was renewed further on 26.09.2013 by SBI and SBBJ and a facility agreement was entered on 03.07.2014 for a total term loan facility of Rs. 95.77 Crore and working capital facility of Rs.7 Crore. The loan amount was disbursed against sanction of each facility. SBT and SBBJ got merged with State Bank of India on 31.03.2017 and the accounts are now maintained at the State Bank of India.

 

# 3. It is stated that Corporate Debtor has defaulted in the repayment of credit facilities and the accounts of SBT became NPA on 05.10.2015 and SBBJ on 06.11.2015. The Financial Creditor has filed OA 443 of 2016 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) on 27.06.2016 for recovery of the due amount of Rs.113.20 Crore. Subsequently the Corporate Debtor vide letter dated 26.02.2019 requested the Financial Creditor for compromise  settlement, which was approved by the Applicant on 21.03.2019 by which the Corporate Debtor has agreed to settle the entire dues of Rs. 77 Crore and 100% cash margin for existing Bank Guarantee for Rs.5.03 crore in addition to Rs. 77 Crores, which was duly acknowledged by the Corporate Debtor on 28.03.2019. On the basis of the compromise settlement jointly agreed between the Corporate Debtor and Financial Creditor, the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) passed a compromise settlement order on 20.09.2019 in OA No.443/2016, by which Corporate Debtor was directed to deposit Rs.12 Crores upfront, Rs.28 Crore on or before 31.03.2019 and balance Rs.37 Crore and cash margin to be paid on or before 25.09.2019. In the compromise, it is stated that if the payments are not effected within the stipulated time, the compromise offer would stand cancelled and Corporate Debtor shall be liable for the entire amount due as per the OA forthwith.

 

# 4. It is further stated that the Corporate Debtor has remitted Rs.12 Crore upfront as part and failed to make the balance payments within the stipulated time of 25.09.2019. The Corporate Debtor made a further payment of Rs.5 Crore and accordingly, a further extension was granted vide letter dated 27.12.2019. It is stated that the Corporate Debtor was required to make payment of Rs.10 Crore before 10.01.2020, Rs.20 Crore before 31.01.2020, Rs. 15 Crore before 28.02.2020 and balance Rs.15 Crore on or before 31.03.2020. Despite granting sufficient time, Corporate Debtor failed to make the balance payment in terms of compromise agreement. Hence, the present application has been filed by the Financial Creditor to initiate Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against the Corporate Debtor under Section 7(4) of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Submission by the Corporate Debtor

 

# 7. The Corporate Debtor filed a counter stating that they have paid initial instalment, but due to COVID pandemic, it could not complete its obligations under the Joint Compromise Statement. The Corporate Debtor has expressed his willingness to proceed with the Compromise Memo and according to them there is no default on the side of the Corporate Debtor.

 

# 8. They have raised the issue of limitation, as the account of the Corporate Debtor in SBT and SBBJ were declared NPA on 05.10.2015 and 06.11.2015 respectively and this application has been filed on 06.09.2021, not within three years from that dates.

 

# 9. It is also stated that the Adjudicating Authority under the IBC is not a substitute forum for collection of debt in the sense it cannot reopen debts which are barred by law, or debts, recovery whereof have become time barred. It is also stated that this Tribunal is not a forum for recovery of debt. Time and again, the appellate forum as well as the Apex Court has reiterated that the provisions of the IBC could not be invoked for recovery of outstanding dues, but could only be invoked to initiate CIRP for just reasons. It is also stated that the Corporate Debtor has not acknowledged its liability to the  Consortium of banks now held by the Financial Creditor within a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the application under Section 7 of the Code.

 

# 10. It is also their contention that the application moved by the Corporate Debtor for One Time Settlement or Restructuring cannot be taken as an acknowledgment of Debt. If the proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 19(1) of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks & Financial Institutions Act of 1993, OA 443/20116 could be taken as proof of acknowledgement to satisfy the requirements under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, then the acknowledgment is only towards the One Time Settlement Amount and not to the amount of Rs. 197 crore as cited by the Financial Creditor in the Section 7 Application. It is further stated that the Corporate Debtor is liable to pay only the balance amount as agreed in the compromise agreement.

 

# 11. It is stated that even after the compromise agreement and Final Order inOA, there are further records to show that the Corporate Debtor has made payments and thus there is no default leading to proceedings under Section 7 of IBC.

 

FINDINGS

# 12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the case records including documents appended with the case records. On perusal of the documents and hearing the arguments advanced by both the sides, this Bench finds it necessary to deal with each issue separately.

  • i. Whether the application is maintainable?

  • ii. Whether this application will come in the purview of multiple proceedings with respect to the same debt?

  • iii. Whether there is a Creditor-Debtor relationship between the Financial Creditor and Corporate Debtor herein and whether this Tribunal can initiate CIRP against the Corporate Debtor?

 

# 13. Point No (i): We have gone through Part IV of the application; wherein it is clearly stated that the loan accounts of the Corporate Debtor in SBT became NPA on 05.10.2015 and SBBJ on 06.11.2015. The date of occurrence of default for the purpose of IBC is stated to be 25.09.2019. It is also seen from the records that the Corporate Debtor made a payment of Rs. 12 Crores on 27.03.2019 and Rs. 5 Crores on 31.12.2019. Section 238A of the IBC, 2016 defines “limitation” which is as under:

 

Section 238A: Limitation.

  • 238A. The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall, as far as may be, apply to the proceedings or appeals before the Adjudicating Authority, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be.

 

# 14. To get further clarity on this issue, we have gone through the Article 37 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which reads as under:

PART II—OTHER APPLICATION

137.

Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division.

Three years

When the right to apply

accrues.

 

# 15. It is settled law as decided by the Hon’ble NCLAT in its order in Neelkanth Township and Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Urban Infrastructure Trustee Ltd. (Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 44 of 2017) that those provisions of the IBC cannot be shackled by the Limitation Act. It is observed that: 

  • “There is nothing on the record that Limitation Act, 2013 is applicable to I&B Code. Learned Counsel for the appellant also failed to lay hand on any of the provision of I&B Code to suggest that the Law of Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable. The I&B Code, 2016 is not an Act for recovery of money claim, it relates to the initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. If there is a debt which includes interest and there is default of debt and having a continuous course of action, the argument that the claim of money by Respondent is barred by Limitation cannot be accepted.”

 

# 16. We therefore, are not agreeable with the submissions made by the Corporate Debtor regarding limitation for filing this application. Hence the application is maintainable.

 

# 17. Point No. (ii). On perusal of the records, we found out that Section 7 of the Code propounds the manner in which Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) is to be initiated by the “financial creditor” against a “corporate person being the corporate debtor”.

 

# 18. The Hon'ble National Company Law Appellant Tribunal ("NCLAT") in various judgments has held that pendency of actions under the SARFAESI Act or actions under RDB Act does not create obstruction for filing an application under IBC on the ground that provisions under IBC shall have overriding effect over any provisions inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.

 

# 19. In this connection the decision of the Hon’ble NCLAT in Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. Mahesh Bansal & Ors., (Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1408 of 2019) order dated on 20.02.2020, may be referred to.

 

# 20. Further on 26.02.2020, in the matter of Punjab National Bank v. M/s Vindhya Cereals Pvt. Ltd., (Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 854 of 2019) the question that arose before the Hon'ble NCLAT was whether subsequent to initiation of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, a financial creditor can be precluded from filing an application under Section 7 of the Code. The Hon'ble NCLAT held that simply because the Financial Creditor had initiated a parallel proceeding against a Corporate Debtor under SARFAESI Act as well as under the Code, it cannot be called malicious. The Hon’ble NCLAT further opined that Section 238 of Code provides that the provisions of the Code shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. Therefore, this non obstante clause of the Code will prevail over any other law for the time being in force. Hence, the contention regarding maintainability will not stand for scrutiny and is to be rejected.

 

# 21. Point No. (iii) From the records produced, we could find that there is a Creditor- Debtor relationship between the Financial Creditor and the Corporate Debtor, since the Corporate Debtor admitted that they received money from the Financial Creditor through various documents produced before this Tribunal and the Corporate Debtor has no case that they have fully repaid the money received from the Financial Creditor.

 

# 22. As there is a default in the payment of the financial debt, which has been confirmed by them in the counter affidavit that the Financial Creditor paid the money to the Corporate Debtor, this Tribunal is of the view that, the present application filed by the Financial Creditor satisfies all the definitions of “Financial Creditor”, “Default” and “Financial Debt” and qualifies for filing an application under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. By mentioning various technical snags the Corporate Debtor cannot wash its hands in repaying the amount borrowed, which is a financial debt owed by them. Hence, there is a Creditor-Debtor relationship with them.

 

# 23. The Corporate Debtor committed default in repayment of the loan amount to the Financial Creditor, and hence its Loan Account was declared as NPA. In the light of above facts and circumstances, the existence of debt and default is reasonably established by the Financial Creditor as a major constituent for admission of an application under Section 7(4) of the I&B Code.

 

# 24. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the application filed in the capacity as a ‘Financial Creditor’ for a ‘financial debt’ which is recoverable from the Corporate Debtor viz., M/s ITMA Hotels India Private Limited is a fit case for admission and initiation of CIRP against the Corporate Debtor. The documents produced on record prove the disbursement of various loan facilities by the Financial Creditor to the Corporate Debtor.

 

# 25. The Application under Sub-Section (4) of Section 7 of I&B Code, 2016 is complete in all respects. Accordingly, the application for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against the Corporate Debtor deserves to be admitted. Hence, the Application No. CP(IB)/30/KOB/2021 is admitted and the following order has been passed: -

 

ORDER

i. Having admitted the Application, the provisions of moratorium as prescribed under Section 14 of the Code shall be operative henceforth with effect from the date of order shall be applicable by prohibiting institution of any suit before a Court of Law, transferring/encumbering any of the assets of the Debtor etc.

 

ii. The Financial Creditor has suggested the name of Shri. Kizhakkekara Kuriakose Jose, an Insolvency Professional for appointment as Interim Resolution Professional (IRP). Accordingly, this Tribunal appoints Shri. Kizhakkekara Kuriakose Jose having Registration No. IBBI/IPA-001/IPP00445/2017-2018/10788, residing at KK Jose & Associates, Yenvee Complex, Temple Road, Aluva, Kerala683 101, email id:- kkjoseca@gmail.com whose name appears in the panel of IPs for appointment as Interim Resolution Professional for the period 01.07.2021 to 31.12.2021 for Kochi Bench, as the Interim Resolution Professional to carry out the functions as mentioned under IBC.

 

iii. The fee payable to IRP or as the case may be to RP shall comply with such regulation/circular and direction as may be issued by the IBBI and the IRP shall carry out his duties as contemplated by Section 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the IBC.

 

iv. The Financial Creditor shall deposit an amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rs. Two Lakhs Only) with the IRP to meet the initial expenses towards issue of public notice and inviting claims etc. These expenses are subject to approval by the Committee of Creditors (CoC).

 

v. The supply of essential services to the “Corporate Debtor” shall not be terminated during Moratorium period. It shall be effective till completion of the Insolvency Resolution Process or until the approval of the Resolution Plan prescribed under Section 31 of the Code, by the Adjudicating Authority.

 

vi. That as prescribed under Section 13 of the Code on declaration of moratorium the next step of Public Announcement of the Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process shall be carried out by the IRP immediately on receipt of this order, as per the provisions of the Code.

 

vii. That the Interim Resolution Professional shall perform the duties as assigned under Section 15 and Section 18 of the Code and inform the progress of the C.I.R.P. and the compliance of the directions of this Order within 30 days to this Bench. Liberty is granted to intimate even at an early date, if need be.

 

viii. The commencement of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process shall be effective from the date of the Order of Admission. 

 

ix. During the CIRP period, the management of the Corporate Debtor shall vest in the IRP/RP in terms of Section 17 of the IBC. The Directors/Officers and Managers of the Corporate Debtor shall provide all documents in their possession and furnish every information in their knowledge to the IRP within a period of one week from the date of receipt of this Order, in default coercive steps will follow.

 

x. The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the Financial Creditor, the Corporate Debtor and the IRP by Speed Post and email within two days from the date of this Order.

 

xi. A copy of this Order be also sent to the Registrar of Companies, Kerala, for updating the Master Data of the Corporate Debtor, who shall send a compliance report in this regard to the Registry of this Tribunal within seven days.

 

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Blogger’s comments; An interesting order. The clock in respect of applicability of limitation for section 7 & 9 applications has been set back by the said order, observing;

 

# 13. Point No (i): We have gone through Part IV of the application; wherein it is clearly stated that the loan accounts of the Corporate Debtor in SBT became NPA on 05.10.2015 and SBBJ on 06.11.2015. The date of occurrence of default for the purpose of IBC is stated to be 25.09.2019. It is also seen from the records that the Corporate Debtor made a payment of Rs. 12 Crores on 27.03.2019 and Rs. 5 Crores on 31.12.2019. . . 

 

# 15. It is settled law as decided by the Hon’ble NCLAT in its order in Neelkanth Township and Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Urban Infrastructure Trustee Ltd. (Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 44 of 2017) that those provisions of the IBC cannot be shackled by the Limitation Act. It is observed that: 

  • “There is nothing on the record that Limitation Act, 2013 is applicable to I&B Code. Learned Counsel for the appellant also failed to lay hand on any of the provision of I&B Code to suggest that the Law of Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable. The I&B Code, 2016 is not an Act for recovery of money claim, it relates to the initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. If there is a debt which includes interest and there is default of debt and having a continuous course of action, the argument that the claim of money by Respondent is barred by Limitation cannot be accepted.”

 

# 16. We therefore, are not agreeable with the submissions made by the Corporate Debtor regarding limitation for filing this application. Hence the application is maintainable.

 

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